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Abstract
This paper studies how the public provision of transportation infrastructure impact
output convergence and trade integration in a two-country dynamic general equilibrium
model in which the transportation cost between countries is endogenously determined by
the stock of public infrastructure in both countries. Because of its particular conception,
the so-called “Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America
(IIRSA)” serves as the case study. Data from Argentina and Brazil is thus used to solve
the model. Two main results emerge. First, increasing public investment in infrastructure
provides an impetus to commercial integration but does not necessarily generate output
convergence. Second, the model shows that the only way for the two countries to achieve
output convergence (in a win-win economic growth scenario) is to coordinate their incre-
ments on public infrastructure, as proposed by IIRSA.
Keywords: catch up policy, convergence, economic integration, infrastructure inte-
gration, IIRSA, South America, steady state
JEL classification: C61, F11, F42, O54.
1 Introduction
The onset of the European sovereign debt crisis in mid-2009 renewed interest in the role of fiscal
and political unification in economic integration. Numerous authors have highlighted the major
role of the fiscal and political aspects of integration, confronting the concept of an economic
union with a political (and/or fiscal) one (Evers, 2012, Issing, 2011, Lane, 2012, Sapir, 2011).
In contrast, little attention has been given to the role of physical (or infrastructure) integration
in economic integration. Considering that all three aspects—economic integration, political
and fiscal integration, and physical integration—are part of a whole concept, namely regional
integration (ECLAC, 2009), it is possible that not only political and fiscal aspects but also
physical ones influence economic integration.1
A general consensus is that a nation’s public infrastructure network serves as a basis for
economic activities. Various studies have revealed that public infrastructure positively affects
a country’s productivity (i.e., Canning, 1999, Cohen and Morrison Paul, 2004, Rioja, 1999)
and economic growth (i.e., Canning and Pedroni, 2008, Pradhan et al., 2014, Sahoo and Dash,
1“Physical integration” refers to the coordinated provision of infrastructure and its services (e.g., construc-
tion of communication channels by connecting transportation, energy, and telecommunications networks at a
regional level between two or more neighboring nations’ governments, resulting in further regional economic
interdependence (ECLAC, 2009, Gramlich, 1994, World-Bank, 1994).
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2012). At an international level, these country effects are likely to spill over across national
borders. For instance, a government’s investment in expanding communication and transporta-
tion networks potentially benefits neighboring commercial partner countries by, for example,
facilitating trade.2 Such externalities are known as “infrastructure spillovers” (Bougheas et al.,
1999, 2003).3 Hence, there is good reason to believe that physical integration projects boost
economic integration. This study, thus, proposes to incorporate the topic of infrastructure in-
vestment into the economic integration debate by investigating whether common infrastructure
investments increase long-run real output convergence and trade integration among countries.
For the purpose of this analysis, the South American region serves as a suitable case study.
Since 2000, South America’s nations have engaged in a process of regional integration, for
which physical integration is a major pillar. The so-called “Initiative for the Integration of
Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA)” or Cosiplan proposes the coordination of
various transportation, communication, and energy infrastructure projects involving two or
more countries.4 According to the 2014 IIRSA Portfolio, this initiative is composed of 579
structural infrastructure projects—with an estimated investment of US $163,324.5 millions—of
which 18.3% (106) have already been completed, 30.9% (179) are in the execution stage, 27.1%
(157) are in the pre-execution phase, and 23.7% (137) are being profiled.5Ej s de Int gración y D sarrollo
Referencia geoeconómica de planificación territorial y gestión del desarrollo sostenible
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Source: Bid-Intal (2011). IIRSA’s achievements and challenges 10 years after its
inception: 2000-2010
Table 1: IIRSA’s Integration and Development Hubs (EIDs)
In addition to the implied investment and consequent economic impacts, perhaps, the most
attractive characteristic of this initiative is its proposal of a new division of territorial spaces.
2The role of infrastructure in determining transportation costs, and thus trade volumes, is well reported by
empirical literature (i.e., Francois and Manchin, 2013, Limao and Venables, 2001, Shepherd and Wilson, 2006).
3For evidence on infrastructure spillovers, see Canning (1999), Cohen and Morrison Paul (2003, 2004), Del Bo
and Florio (2008), Pereira and Andraz (2010).
4In 2008, the formation of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) provided IIRSA with a new
institutional framework and asserted its continuity. Later in 2011, the South American Infrastructure and
Planning Council (Cosiplan) assumed this coordination role and defined the Strategic Action Plan, 2012–2022.
The physical integration project in South America continues to function even today and provides an appealing
set of dynamics to be examined in line with the objectives of this study.
5It is worth mentioning that IIRSA is Unasur’s most advanced project. The initiative has been cataloged
as a process of “silent” integration because, despite the difficulties in political and economic integration (e.g.,
political frictions from Paraguay’s expulsion from the bloc owing to the 2012 coup d’etat), physical integration
continues to work (ECLAC, 2009).
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National borders are no longer the reference. As shown in Table 1, the South American con-
tinent is divided by Integration and Development Hubs (EIDs), an unprecedented territorial
conception that distinguishes 10 strategic South American sub-regions.6 Certainly, numerous
dynamics emerge from such a design. This study pays exclusive attention to the potential long-
run output convergence and commercial integration effects of this initiative. More specifically,
the following questions are addressed:
(i) What are the potential gains or losses (in terms of output convergence and trade integration)
of raising publicly provided transportation infrastructure?
(ii) Does a coordinated increase of public investment in transportation infrastructure, as un-
dertaken by Unasur through the IIRSA-Cosiplan initiative, improve gains or generate
losses?
A micro-foundation, two-country general equilibrium model is constructed to study these issues.
The role of infrastructure stock is twofold: it is a publicly provided input in intermediate goods
production and it determines the bilateral cost of trade. Infrastructure is exclusively restricted
to transportation (e.g., roads and highways, airports, and harbors) and transportation cost is
assumed to depend on the public stock of infrastructure (the two countries are neighboring trade
partners). Thus, this study focuses on implications for regional integration of the coordinated
and uncoordinated public provisions of transportation infrastructure.
No. of Projects % Projects
Estimated Investment
% Investment
(US $ million)
Argentina 159 30.8 26,784.47 24.7
Bolivia 45 8.7 3,866.29 3.6
Brazil 95 18.4 44,135.36 40.7
Chile 58 11.2 12,816.20 11.8
Colombia 28 5.4 4,790.93 4.4
Ecuador 34 6.6 1,385.82 1.3
Guyana 7 1.4 911.90 0.8
Paraguay 55 10.7 7,145.89 6.6
Peru 68 13.2 11,309.59 10.4
Suriname 6 1.2 3,831.90 3.5
Uruguay 32 6.2 3,218.06 3.0
Venezuela 13 2.5 722.75 0.7
Total 579 100 120,919.17 100
Source: Cosiplan Portfolio Projects Database (April 2015; www.iirsa.org/proyectos)
Table 2: Portfolio summary by country (transportation projects)
To solve the model, I adopt data from Argentina and Brazil because of their consequent
investment share in the IIRSA-Cosiplan portfolio. As described in Table 2, Argentina and
Brazil account for the 24.7% and 40.7% of the total estimated investment in transportation
projects, a majority of which are publicly financed (i.e., 99% in Argentina and 77% in Brazil;
see Table 3).
The model is extended to a number of experiments and the results reveal that increasing
public investment in infrastructure provides an impetus to commercial integration but does not
6An EID is a multinational territorial space with specific natural resources, human settlements, production
areas, and logistics services. Transportation, energy, and communications infrastructure serve as its links
because they facilitate the flow of people, goods and services, and information within the territorial space as
well as to and from the rest of the world.
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Argentina Brazil
Financing No. of Investment No. of Investment
projects (US $ million) projects (US $ million)
Public projects 157 98.74 21,622,471 99.98 73 76.84 27,479.41 62.26
Private projects 1 0.63 5,100 0.02 17 17.89 13,939.87 31.58
Private–public projects 1 0.63 62 0.00 5 5.26 2,716.07 6.15
Source: Cosiplan Portfolio Projects Database (April 2015; www.iirsa.org/proyectos)
Table 3: Argentinian and Brazilian transportation projects: Cosiplan Portfolio
necessarily generate output convergence. In addition, the model shows that the only way for
the two countries to achieve output convergence (in a win-win economic growth scenario) is to
coordinate their increments on public infrastructure, as proposed by IIRSA-Cosiplan.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed explanation
of the model. Section 3 discusses the calibration and presents the benchmark steady state.
Section 4 presents a number of policy experiments and the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model comprises two countries: Home (i = 1) and Foreign (i = 2). Each country includes
three sectors: (1) a tradable intermediate goods sector that uses domestic physical capital and
labor (2) a non-tradable final goods sector that uses both Home and Foreign intermediate goods
as inputs, and (3) a transportation services sector that uses labor. Neither capital nor labor is
internationally mobile.7
In each country, a representative firm is exclusive to each sector and operates in a com-
petitive market. Trade is costly and assumed to depend on transportation cost, which in turn
is contingent on the levels of public (transportation) infrastructure in both countries. Each
country’s government determines the level of public transportation infrastructure and collects
taxes to finance its provision. In each economy, the infinitely lived representative household
supplies labor, rents capital, and gains utility from consuming a final domestic good. Finally,
their markets are complete, that is, households have access to state-contingent securities.
2.1 Firms
As mentioned, each economy encompasses three sectors: intermediate goods sector, final goods
sector, and transportation service sector.
2.1.1 Intermediate Goods Sector
The representative intermediate firm in country i specializes in the production of one tradable
intermediate good, zi, using labor ni,t, private capital ki,t, and public capital k
g
i,t, according to
7Even if Argentina and Brazil are members of the Mercosur, an incomplete common market, labor and
capital mobility between them remains low. For instance, according to the capital openness index (Chinn and
Ito, 2011), Argentina is the second less financially open Unasur country after Venezuela and ranks 106th among a
set of 166 countries. After the collapse of convertibility (the 2001–2002 crisis), Argentina imposed strict control
over capital outflows (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2010), which continues even today. Thus, the non-international
mobility of factors is not completely unrealistic.
4
the following Cobb-Douglas technology:8
zi,t ≡ F
(
ki,t, ni,t, k
g
i,t
)
= ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ
kαi,tn
1−α
i,t , (1)
where ai,t is total factor productivity (TFP) and α and γ denote private and public capital
shares in output. The production function has constant returns to scale in the two private
inputs, ni,t and ki,t, and increasing returns in all three factors.
Firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Therefore, as detailed in Appendix
A.1, profit maximization implies that factors will be optimally allocated according to
αwi,tni,t = (1− α)κi,tki,t, or wi,t
κi,t
=
(
1− α
α
)
ki,t
ni,t
, (2)
where wi,t and κi,t denote the wage and rental rate of private capital in country i in terms of
the intermediate goods produced in country 1, which is selected as the numeraire good for both
countries. Note that
(
1−α
α
) ki,t
ni,t
is the marginal rate of technical substitution and
wi,t
κi,t
the isocost
slope.
Optimal pricing under perfect competition implies that the production price equates marginal
cost, that is,
αα (1− α)1−α ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ
= καi,tw
1−α
i,t . (3)
The standard condition that factor prices equal their respective marginal products can be
obtained from the combination of (2) and (3); hence,
α
zi,t
ki,t
= κi,t, (4)
(1− α) zi,t
ni,t
= wi,t. (5)
2.1.2 Trade Cost and Transportation Infrastructure
Intermediate goods trade is costly and involves an iceberg-type trade cost, τt: for each good
shipped, 1/(1 + τt) goods arrive at the destination. Following Mun and Nakagawa (2010), it is
assumed that the only cost incurred in trade is transportation; thus, the presence of τt means
that a certain fraction of the traded good disappears in transportation. Furthermore, this
transportation cost is assumed to depend on the public stock of infrastructure: changes in this
cost signify those in infrastructure.9 Hence,
dτi,t
kgi,t
< 0 and
d2i,tτ
kg2i,t
> 0, such that an improvement
in transportation infrastructure reduces the bilateral trade cost. Formally,
τt =
χ(
kg1,t
)η (
kg2,t
)1−η , (6)
where η is the size of country 1 relative to country 2 and χ is an adjustment parameter.
Moreover, it is supposed that production and consumption in each country occur in a single
location, which is defined as the market (i.e., intermediate goods are transported between
markets in the two countries), and the importer country incurs the trade cost. In this case, by
denoting qt as the price of z2,t in terms of the numeraire, z1,t, it follows that the price of one
unit of imported intermediate good, z2,t, in country 1 is qt (1 + τt).
8Public capital is provided without user charges (no congestion), and thus, public capital is assumed to be
a pure public good.
9A similar reasoning is used by Martin and Rogers (1995) to examine the impact of public infrastructure on
industrial location.
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2.1.3 Final Goods Sector
Here, firms buy intermediate goods produced by both countries to produce a final good, which
can be consumed or invested. The final good, yi, is produced according to the following constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) technology function:
yi,t =
[
ϕ
1
µ
i (zii,t)
µ−1
µ + (1− ϕi)
1
µ (zij,t)
µ−1
µ
] µ
µ−1
, for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, (7)
where µ > 1 measures the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. ϕi ∈ [0, 1]
governs the importance of the Home-produced (country 1) intermediate goods in the final
goods production composite yi.
10 zii and zij denote the units of Home- and Foreign-produced
intermediate goods used as inputs in country i = 1, 2’s final goods production. Note that z12
(z21) is an imported input used to produce y1 (y2); thus, firms producing final goods face trade
costs when importing inputs. Accordingly, they choose the quantity of Home and Foreign input
to maximize their profits:
max
z11,t,z12,t
: p1,ty1,t − [z11,t + qt (1 + τt) z12,t] for country 1
max
z22,t,z21,t
: p2,ty2,t −
[
z22,t + q
−1
t (1 + τt) z21,t
]
for country 2
subject to (7), where pi,t is the relative price of the final good i in terms of the numeraire. As
detailed in Appendix A.2, the optimal demands for zii, and zij in country i are
z11,t = ϕ1p
µ
1,ty1,t ; z12,t = (1− ϕ1)
[
p1,t
qt (1 + τt)
]µ
y1,t (8)
, z21,t = (1− ϕ2)
[
p2,tqt
(1 + τt)
]µ
y2,t ; z22,t = ϕ2p
µ
2,ty2,t, (9)
and the price indexes of the final goods respectively are
p1,t =
[
ϕ1 + (1− ϕ1) [qt (1 + τt)]1−µ
] 1
1−µ , (10)
p2,t =
[
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ2)
[
(1 + τt)
qt
]1−µ] 11−µ
. (11)
Accordingly, the real exchange rate can be defined as the relative price of final goods, that
is,
p2,t
p1,t
=
[
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ2)
[
q−1t (1 + τt)
]1−µ
ϕ1 + (1− ϕ1) [qt (1 + τt)]1−µ
] 1
1−µ
.
2.2 Representative Household
Each economy is inhabited by an infinitely lived representative household, which maximizes
the expected intertemporal utility function:
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtU (ci,s, 1− ni,s)
}
, i = 1, 2, (12)
10ϕi depends on the relative size of the Home economy (country 1), η, and a trade openness measure, θi.
Precisely, ϕ1 = 1− (1− η)θ and ϕ2 = ηθ.
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where β ∈ ]0, 1[ is the subjective discount factor and
U (ci,t, 1− ni,t) = ln (ci,t) + γn,i ln (1− ni,t) , i = 1, 2 (13)
represents a household’s preferences over (state-contingent) domestic final goods consumption,
cit, and hours supplied to the labor market, ni,t. A household’s time endowment is normalized
to one, so that utility is obtained from leisure (1− ni,t) and consumption. Moreover, capital
stock, ki,t, is accumulated (to be rented to the local firm producing final goods) on the basis of
the following law of motion:
xi,t = ki,t+1 − (1− δ) ki,t, (14)
where xi,t denotes investment in domestic capital and δ ∈ ]0, 1[ is the depreciation rate. As in
Mendoza (1991), capital accumulation is subject to quadratic adjustment costs:
ACi,t =
φ
2
(ki,t+1 − ki,t)2 . (15)
In period t ≥ 0, the representative household of country i is assumed to have access to a
complete contingent claims market. Let rt,t+s denote the stochastic discount factor, such that
Etrt,t+sdi,t+s is the price in period t of a random payment di,t+s in terms of the final good 1 in
period t + s. In addition, the representative household pays taxes on its total income at the
rate of τi,t. Hence, household i’s period-by-period budget constraint in terms of the numeraire
is
pi,t (ci,t + xi,t + ACi,t) + Etrt,t+1di,t+1 ≤ (wi,tni,t + κi,tki,t) (1− ρi,t) + d1,t. (16)
The representative household i chooses ci,t, ni,t, ki,t+1, and di,t+1 to maximize (12) subject
to (??), (14), and (15) and the following no-ponzi game constraint:
lim
s→∞
Etrt,t+sdi,t+s ≥ 0.
As detailed in Appendix A.3, the optimality conditions for the household problem can be
summarized by
pi,tci,t
1− ni,t =
wi,t (1− ρi,t)
γn,i
, (17)
1 + φ (ki,t+1 − ki,t) = βEt ci,t
ci,t+1
[
1− δ + φ (ki,t+2 − ki,t+1) + κi,t+1
pi,t+1
(1− ρi,t+1)
]
, (18)
β−1Etrt,t+1 = Et
pi,tci,t
pi,t+1ci,t+1
, (19)
where (17) is the labor supply function that captures the intra-temporal trade-off between
consumption and labor hours, (18) is the inter-temporal Euler equation that governs the ac-
cumulation of domestic capital, and 1 + φ (ki,t+1 − ki,t) for i = 1, 2 corresponds to Tobin’s Q
standard representation. Moreover, the combination of (19) for i = 1, 2 results in the complete
market risk-sharing condition, that is,
θp2,tc2,t = p1,tc1,t, (20)
where θ is a constant that depends on the initial cross-country distribution of wealth.
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2.3 Government
It is assumed that the entire revenue from taxing the representative agent’s income is used used
for public infrastructure investment, such that the government’s budget constraint in country
i in terms of final good 1 is
pi,tx
g
i,t = ρi,t (wi,tni,t + κi,tki,t) , (21)
where δg is the infrastructure depreciation rate and x
g
i,t
(
= kgi,t+1 − (1− δg)kgi,t
)
is public invest-
ment, which is assumed to be the only public expenditure. It is convenient to interpret ρi,t as
a share of each country’s output that is allocated to infrastructure investments.
2.4 Market Clearings
The equilibrium in the state-contingent assets market is given by
d1,t + d2,t = 0.
The market clearing conditions in the intermediate goods markets are given by
ηz1,t = ηz11,t + z21,t, (22)
z2,t = z22,t + ηz12,t. (23)
The final goods markets clear when the total purchases of final goods equal the total production
of final goods, that is,
c1,t + x1,t + x
g
1,t + AC1,t = y1,t (24)
c2,t + x2,t + x
g
2,t + AC2,t = y2,t. (25)
The relationship between the current account and trade balance is denoted by a combination
of budget constraints, zero-profit conditions, and market clearing conditions:
Etrt,t+1d1,t+1 − d1,t = z21,t − (1 + τt) qtz12,t, (26)
Etrt,t+1d2,t+1 − d2,t = z12,t − (1 + τt) q−1t z21,t. (27)
2.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a set of prices and quantities that, for all t > 0, solves the household’s
optimization problem, given budget constraints, borrowing constraints, and the capital law of
motion, and the firms’ optimization problem, given the production functions, as well as satisfies
all market clearings. Appendix A.4 provides a summary of the equilibrium conditions.
3 Quantitative Evaluation of the Model
3.1 Calibration
The quantitative analysis of the model focuses on Argentina (Home country, i.e., i = 1) and
Brazil (Foreign country, i.e., i = 2). The model is parameterized at a quarterly frequency.
In addition to country size, n, and home bias, ϕi, the two principal asymmetry sources in
the model are government taxation, ρi, and TFP, ai.
11 Both common and country-specific
parameters are thus differentiated. The parameter values are chosen from the literature and to
11The two sources are included to account for technological differences and publicly provided capital stock
specificities in the analysis of individual output dynamics.
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match the features of the concerned economies’ macroeconomic data for 2000–2011, using the
Penn World Table (PWT) 8.0, IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Government
Finance Statistics (GFS), and the World Bank databases.12 Table 4 resumes the retained
parametrization.
Common parameters. The discount factor, β, is set to its conventional value of 0.99, implying
an annual steady-state real interest rate of 4%. Following Hulten (1996), Canning and Fay
(1993), and Easterly and Rebelo (1993)’s average estimates for developing countries, the public
infrastructure share in the production of intermediate goods, γ, is set to 0.10. The depreciation
rate of private capital, δ, is set to a standard value of 0.10 per year, corresponding to 0.025
per quarter. As for the public depreciation rate, the World Bank has estimated it to be
about twice as high as δ; thus, δg is set to 0.05. As is standard in literature, the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is set to µ = 1.5 (Backus et al., 1993)
and capital adjustment costs are set to φ = 0.025 (Mendoza, 1991). The capital share in
intermediate goods production, α, is set to 0.54 according to Elias (1992)’s estimation for seven
Latin American countries, including Argentina and Brazil. The adjustment parameter, χ, is
set to match the benchmark steady-state transportation cost of τ = 0.16, which is set using
Hummels (1999)’s estimations for average expenditure on freight and insurance as a proportion
of manufacturing imports’ value for Argentina (15.5%) and Brazil (17.7%). Thus, τ = 0.16 is
the Argentina–Brazil average of Hummels (1999)’s estimations.
Argentina Brazil
Total Factor Productivity, ai 1.2488 1
Households’ income tax rate, τi 0.0348 0.0149
Home bias, ϕi 0.885 0.978
Weight on leisure in preferences, γn,i 3.664 3.889
Discount factor, β 0.99
Private capital depreciation rate, δ 0.025
Public capital depreciation rate, δg 0.05
Public infrastructure share in intermediate goods production, γ 0.10
Capital share in intermediate goods production, α 0.54
Intermediate goods substitutability, µ 1.5
Capital adjustment costs, φ 0.025
Adjustment parameter, χ 0.462
Source: Original data from PWT 8.0, IFS, GFS, and World Bank databases.
Table 4: Calibrated parameters (Home country: Argentina).
Country-specific parameters. TFP, ai, is set using PWT 8.0’s information for Argentina
and Brazil (2000–2011 average). Accordingly, Argentina’s and Brazil’s TFP are 0.546 and
0.438, respectively. Foreign TFP is normalized to one (what matters is relative TFP), so
that a1 = 1.2488 and a2 = 1.
13 As in Rioja (2003), the model assumes that tax income is
used to finance public expenditure on infrastructure; thus, it is pertinent to calibrate ρi as
a fraction of GDP devoted to infrastructure investment in each country. Using data from
IMF’s GFS database, the income taxation rates are set to ρ1 = 0.0348 and ρ2 = 0.0149.
14
The preference for Home-made intermediate goods in the final goods production composite is
12The period of 2000–2011 covers almost the entire lifetime of IIRSA. Remember that IIRSA was initiated in
September 2000.
13PWT’s version 8.0 provides two types of TFP information: first is a relative measure of TFP levels across
countries (relative to the United States, which is normalized to one) and the second type is conceived to compare
TFP growth over time. For the purpose of this study, the first measure of TFP is retained.
14The values are an average of the “Transport, Cash Expenses of the Budg. Cen. Govt.” item in IMF’s GFS
database for 1995–2001.
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computed considering the size of Argentina relative to Brazil, η, and the trade openness of the
domestic country (Argentina), ϑ, on the basis of ϕ1 = 1− (1− η)ϑ and ϕ2 = ηϑ. Using World
Bank data, η is set to 0.2073 and ϑ corresponds to the Argentinian imports–GDP ratio, that is,
ϑ = 0.139. Finally, the parameter governing the weight of leisure in preferences, γn,i, is chosen
such that, in the steady state, the hours worked are 30% of the daily available time; that is,
for Argentina, γn,1 = 3.664 and for Brazil, γn,1 = 3.889.
3.2 Benchmark Steady State
The implied steady state is summarized in Table 5. As, according to the calibration, both
Argentina’s productivity, a1, and public investment, ρ1, are superior, its public capital stock
and real GDP are significantly higher than those in Brazil. The benchmark, thus, reflects a
situation wherein Argentina is the wealthier country (e.g., higher consumption and real wages).
Argentina (i = 1) Brazil (i = 2)
Output, yi 0.6614 0.3038
Consumption, ci 0.4922 0.2233
Hours worked, ni 0.3000 0.3000
Private capital stock, ki 5.8704 3.0258
Capital rent rate (×100), κi 3.7300 3.5979
Public capital stock, kgi 0.4492 0.0971
Real wage, wi 2.7007 1.5457
Final good’s price index pi 1.0236 1.0089
Country i’s imports (in yi %) 8.6694 1.1062
Output gap, ygap = y1 − y2 0.3577
Source: Benchmark steady-state values; the values correspond to the
benchmark parameters detailed in Table 4.
Table 5: Steady-state benchmark values.
This benchmark is consistent with reality. According to the World Bank data, Argentina’s
GDP PPP per capita (units) is 18,917.284, while that of Brazil is 12,525.674, respectively
corresponding to 12.5% and 8.3% of the total South American GDP. Remember that the model
accounts for size differences between the involved countries; thus, a per capita comparison is
pertinent.15
All experiments reported hereinafter reference this benchmark as a depart point.
4 Policy Experiments
This section analyzes the macroeconomic effects of increasing the share of output allocated to
investment in transportation infrastructure ρi. The focus is on the long-run evolution of output
convergence, measured as the gap between both countries’ real GDP (ygap = |y1 − y2|), and
bilateral trade integration, measured by the standard openness index (ιi = (z12 + z21)/yi).
16
15Even if Argentina’s superiority is well accounted for in the benchmark, it does not perfectly match with
reality. According to the model, Argentina’s output is 2.18 times Brazil’s output, while according to data,
Argentina’s output is only 1.51 times that of Brazil. This imperfection does not change the essence of the
conclusions but the quantification of the effects.
16It is pertinent to use the standard openness index as a proxy measure of commercial integration in view of
the retained two-country framework.
10
The experiments’ objective is twofold. First, they investigate the potential gain or loss (in
terms of output convergence and trade integration) from raising publicly provided transporta-
tion infrastructure unilaterally (only one of the two country partners increases its GDP share of
public investment) and bilaterally (both country partners raise its GDP share of public invest-
ment without caring (or knowing) what the other country does). Second is to elucidate whether
a coordinated increase of public investment in transportation infrastructure, as undertaken by
Unasur through Cosiplan, potentially improves such gains or losses.
To do so, a number of experiments are conducted and vary the size of ρ1 and ρ2 between
their benchmark value (ρ1 = 0.035, ρ2 = 0.015) and 0.1. Each experiment re-solves the model
using the new values of ρ1 and ρ2 and calculates the resulting net steady-state change in the
variables of interest.
Before presenting the experiments’ results, it is worth recalling that the general equilibrium
effects of a change in public investment through ρi (a taxation change) are manifold.
17 For
instance, because governments invest the entire tax revenue in public infrastructure, a higher
taxation rate, ρi, means higher public capital stock, k
g
i,t (Eq. (21)). Then, higher public capital
stock pushes up the production of domestic intermediate goods, zi,t (Eq. (1)), thus increasing
the supply of inputs to final goods production which, in turn, could eventually increase output,
yi,t (Eq. (7)).
On the other hand, expanded public capital stock reduces the cost of trade, τt (Eq. (6)),
thus modifying the demand of foreign intermediate goods, zij,t, (Eqs. (8) and (9)) and domestic
output, yi,t. The improved availability of foreign inputs could improve the production of domes-
tic final goods. However, less transportation cost also means higher demand for domestically
produced intermediate goods abroad, and thus, less availability of domestic inputs in the local
market and possibly, production of domestic final goods. The effect is, therefore, ambiguous.
What is less ambiguous, however (i.e., because of the model’s construction), is that higher
investment in public infrastructure is expected to directly increase the volume of exchanged
merchandise between the two countries, and thus, increase commercial integration; this is true
for Cosiplan because of the infrastructure projects’ nature and implementation objectives, as
presented in Section 1.
Thus, the resulting effect on yi,t is a combination of several dynamics, without demand-side
effects generated from a taxation increase in purchasing power, ergo consumption. This section
focuses not on disentangling these multiple effects, even if conscientious of its importance, but
on the interaction of these effects between the two countries by analyzing output gap (economic
convergence) and commercial integration.
4.1 Unilateral policy
The first set of experiments comprises progressive increases in public investment in only one
of the two countries. Remember that the principal sources of heterogeneity between both
economies are government taxation (thus, public capital stock) and TFP. In the benchmark
stage, Argentina is superior in both aspects. Hence, the Brazilian government’s attempt to
increase public investment can be seen as a “catch-up” policy. Figure 1 graphically describes the
effects of such a unilateral policy and displays the percentage change in the bilateral output gap
from the benchmark for the several values of Brazil’s public investment, ρ2. More specifically,
Figure 1 presents the resulting effects on y1, y2, and ygap after successive increases of ρ2: ρ2 ∈
[0.015, 0.1], assuming that Argentina does not implement any policy, notably that ρ1. According
to Figure 1, the Brazilian policy positively affects its real GDP (the green curve is above the
zero axis) and negatively affects Argentina’s output (the blue curve is below the zero axis).
Indeed, the output net effect appears to favor Brazil’s catch up policy: output gap significantly
17Hereinafter, public investment refers to that in transportation infrastructure in GDP percent.
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Figure 1: Brazil’s increased public investment in transportation infrastructure (GDP percent):
ρ2 and ∆ρ1
reduces (red line). However, this catch up causes an output loss in Argentina.18 Thus, the
result is a win-lose catch up.
Table 6 exposes the quantitative effects of the unilateral Brazilian policy. As expected, the
cost of trade decreases (%∆τ < 0); however, the amount of exchanged merchandise increases
unilaterally (∆z12 < 0 and %∆z21 > 0). More specifically, Brazilian imports of Argentinian
goods, z21, increase, while Argentinian imports of Brazilian goods, z12, decrease. As Argentina
is worst off after the Brazilian policy (%∆y1 < 0) because of the home bias, its imports
are reduced. The consequent effect on commercial integration is negative for Brazil, where
aggregated exports and imports as a share of output, (z12 + z21)/yi, decreases with the increase
in taxation for the financing of public infrastructure (%∆ι2 < 0).
Interestingly, Argentina’s capital stock is reduced because of the Brazilian policy. This is
because, at the steady state, public capital stock is determined by not only ρi but also pi (and
zi) (Eq. (71)). In turn, pi is determined by τ (Eqs. (65) and (66)). Thus, the one-sided
improvement in Brazilian public capital stock reduces that of Argentina in the long run.1920
In sum, a unilateral catching-up policy is not as positive as expected, particularly in terms
of economic convergence and commercial integration. In addition, further mechanisms need to
be explored.
In continuing the experiment, the same logic is applied to Argentina. This time, Argentina
18A further version of the model is envisaged to account for individual welfare, such that the gains and/or
loses of this experiment can be measured in welfare terms.
19As described in Appendix A.5, at the steady state, public capital stock is determined by ρi, pi, and zi:
kgi = (ρ¯i/δgp¯i)zi. pi, in turn, is determined by τ : p¯1 = [ϕ1 + (1− ϕ1)(1 + τ)1−µ]1/(1−µ). Thus, capital stock in
one country can be modified by the change in that of the other through τt = χ/[
(
kg1,t
)η (
kg2,t
)1−η
].
20The transmission mechanism underlying the interaction of public capital stocks in the two neighboring
countries will be pursued in future research.
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ρ1=0.035
ρ2 % ∆k
g
1 %∆k
g
2 %∆τ %∆y1 %∆y2 %∆ygap %∆z12 %∆z21 %∆ι1 %∆ι2
0.015 - - - - - - - - - -
0.020 -0.574 43.273 -1.774 -0.861 7.72 -8.149 -0.436 8.822 0,946 -7,096
0.025 -0.419 32.581 -1.697 -0.686 6.268 -7.613 -0.407 7.438 0,758 -5,836
0.030 -0.313 26.227 -1.646 -0.571 5.355 -7.36 -0.412 6.594 0,616 -5,044
0.035 -0.234 22.014 -1.608 -0.489 4.726 -7.283 -0.436 6.032 0,501 -4,503
0.040 -0.172 19.014 -1.577 -0.428 4.263 -7.33 -0.472 5.635 0,404 -4,114
0.045 -0.122 16.768 -1.551 -0.38 3.908 -7.479 -0.516 5.344 0,318 -3,822
0.050 -0.079 15.023 -1.529 -0.342 3.625 -7.717 -0.564 5.124 0,241 -3,596
0.055 -0.042 13.626 -1.509 -0.311 3.393 -8.044 -0.617 4.955 0,172 -3,417
0.060 -0.009 12.482 -1.49 -0.285 3.200 -8.466 -0.671 4.824 0,108 -3,272
0.065 0.022 11.528 -1.474 -0.263 3.035 -8.992 -0.728 4.72 0,05 -3,152
0.070 0.050 10.719 -1.459 -0.244 2.893 -9.645 -0.785 4.639 -0,003 -3,052
0.075 0.076 10.025 -1.445 -0.227 2.769 -10.453 -0.843 4.575 -0,052 -2,966
0.080 0.101 9.422 -1.431 -0.213 2.659 -11.461 -0.902 4.525 -0,097 -2,892
0.085 0.126 8.893 -1.419 -0.200 2.561 -12.738 -0.961 4.487 -0,138 -2,826
0.090 0.149 8.424 -1.408 -0.188 2.473 -14.391 -1.02 4.457 -0,175 -2,767
0.095 0.173 8.008 -1.397 -0.178 2.393 -16.598 -1.078 4.436 -0,208 -2,713
0.100 0.196 7.634 -1.387 -0.168 2.32 -19.676 -1.137 4.422 -0,237 -2,662
Table 6: Unilateral increase of public investment in transportation infrastructure, ∆ρ2 > 0, in
country i = 2
unilaterally increases its taxation rate to finance new infrastructure projects. Figure 2 reports
the percent change in y1, y2, and ygap after successive increases of ρ1: ρ1 ∈ [0.035, 0.1], assuming
that ρ2. According to the figure, Argentina increases its real GDP (%∆y1) and Brazil suffers a
diminishing real GDP. Considering the benchmark situation, this causes a considerable increase
in the output gap (red line in Figure 2). Thus, the result is again a win-lose situation, but
without an output catch up.
Table 7 presents some quantitative effects. As in the previous experiment, the cost of
trade unambiguously declines; however, the opposite holds true for import demand. In this
case, Argentinian imports of Brazilian goods increase, %∆z12 > 0, while Brazilian imports
of Argentinian goods decrease, %∆z21 < 0. Interestingly, both countries appear to increase
their commercial openness index (%∆ι1 > 0 and %∆ι2 > 0). Thus, the resulting net effect on
commercial integration is positive.
In sum, a unilateral Argentinian policy is positive for commercial integration, but not for
economic convergence between the two analyzed economies.
4.2 Coordinated and Uncoordinated Policies
One could also assume that both partner countries’ governments decide to increase investment
in infrastructure, which is more likely in the long run. To analyze the effects of such a bilateral
policy, two experiments are performed. First, it is supposed that Argentinian and Brazilian
authorities decide to progressively increase their investment in public infrastructure by equal
amounts: ∆ρ1 = ∆ρ2 = 0.005. This is a type of uncoordinated policy; that is, irrespective
of what the partner country does, the government maintains their decision of a progressive
increase of ρi. Second, the Cosiplan projects portfolio is considered when setting taxes; thus,
∆ρ1 and ∆ρ2 change coordinates in time, so that the required public investment to complete
the regional infrastructure projects is attained.
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Figure 2: Unilateral increase of public investment in transportation infrastructure (GDP per-
cent): ∆ρ1, ρ2
ρ2=0.015
ρ1 % ∆k
g
1 %∆k
g
2 %∆τ %∆y1 %∆y2 %∆ygap %∆z12 %∆z21 %∆ι1 %∆ι2
0.035 - - - - - - - - - -
0.040 18.873 -0.052 -0.274 4.183 -0.213 7.916 4.755 -0.584 0.266 4.682
0.045 16.606 -0.026 -0.284 3.805 -0.183 6.938 4.459 -0.633 0.371 4.382
0.050 14.848 -0.004 -0.294 3.509 -0.16 6.198 4.235 -0.681 0.463 4.154
0.055 13.443 0.016 -0.304 3.269 -0.14 5.618 4.063 -0.726 0.546 3.978
0.060 12.296 0.034 -0.313 3.071 -0.122 5.151 3.927 -0.77 0.622 3.839
0.065 11.340 0.051 -0.321 2.904 -0.107 4.767 3.820 -0.812 0.692 3.728
0.070 10.532 0.066 -0.33 2.762 -0.094 4.447 3.734 -0.854 0.758 3.638
0.075 9.84 0.081 -0.338 2.639 -0.082 4.174 3.664 -0.894 0.820 3.565
0.080 9.239 0.094 -0.346 2.531 -0.071 3.94 3.608 -0.933 0.88 3.506
0.085 8.713 0.108 -0.354 2.436 -0.061 3.736 3.563 -0.971 0.936 3.458
0.090 8.249 0.121 -0.362 2.352 -0.052 3.557 3.526 -1.008 0.991 3.419
0.095 7.836 0.133 -0.369 2.276 -0.043 3.399 3.497 -1.044 1.043 3.387
0.100 7.466 0.146 -0.377 2.208 -0.035 3.257 3.473 -1.079 1.093 3.361
Table 7: Unilateral increase of public investment in transportation infrastructure. ∆ρ1 > 0. in
country i = 1
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4.2.1 Uncoordinated Policy
Figure 3 describes the percent change of y1, y2, and ygap for different combinations of ρ1 and ρ2.
Table 8 reports the corresponding quantitative effects. As described in Table 8, the experiment
comprises successive increases of ρi by 0.005, departing from the benchmark value. The net
effect on real GDP after an improvement in public investment is positive for both countries (win-
win scenario in terms of output growth). However, this effect is larger for Brazil, the country
departing from a lower public investment rate, because of the usual diminishing returns of the
model’s micro-foundations. The result is a positive net effect on output gap for low values of
ρi and a negative net effect thereafter. Note that a negative change in ygap is positive in terms
of economic convergence.
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Figure 3: Increase of public investment in transportation infrastructure in both countries(GDP
percent): ∆ρ1 = ∆ρ2 = 0.005
ρ1 ρ2 % ∆k
g
1 %∆k
g
2 %∆τ %∆y1 %∆y2 %∆ygap %∆z12 %∆z21 %∆ι1 %∆ι2
0.035 0.015 - - - - - - - - - -
0.040 0.020 25.175 75.056 -7.833 4.248 11.218 -0.643 9.411 13.132 5.135 -1.454
0.045 0.025 15.98 43.241 -2.063 2.974 7.552 -0.621 4.022 8.216 1.232 -3.077
0.050 0.030 14.426 32.579 -1.997 2.894 6.141 0.134 3.836 6.827 1.075 -2.017
0.055 0.035 13.151 26.242 -1.951 2.792 5.257 0.572 3.661 5.954 0.971 -1.394
0.060 0.040 12.09 22.043 -1.915 2.688 4.648 0.841 3.500 5.350 0.894 -0.996
0.065 0.045 11.195 19.053 -1.886 2.589 4.201 1.012 3.353 4.904 0.833 -0.727
0.070 0.050 10.431 16.814 -1.859 2.496 3.858 1.122 3.22 4.559 0.783 -0.538
0.075 0.055 9.772 15.073 -1.834 2.410 3.584 1.193 3.099 4.282 0.741 -0.400
Table 8: Increase of public investment in transportation infrastructure in both countries: ∆ρ1 =
∆ρ2 = 0.005
On the other hand, the simultaneous increase in public investment implies a positive net
effect on public capital stock in both countries with a subsequent reduction in trade cost.
Thus, overseas demands for both Brazilian and Argentinian intermediate products increase
15
(%∆z12 > 0 and %∆z21 > 0), implying increased international commerce between both nations.
Nevertheless, the net effect on trade integration is different for the two countries. Argentina’s
trade volume to GDP ratio, (z12 + z21)/yi, increases, while that of Brazil diminishes. Brazil’s
larger net GDP improvement appears to smooth its openness index relative to Argentina.
On the whole, a simultaneous non-coordinated increase of public investment in infrastructure
individually increases real output in both countries, but it does not reduce the output gap
between them. Moreover, despite the increase in the volume of exchanged merchandise, the
standard measure of trade openness does not evolve in the same direction in the two countries.
4.2.2 Coordinated Policy
This last experiment is based on the Cosiplan projects portfolio and is conducted in a setting
with a combination of ρ1 and ρ2. As described in Table 2, Argentina and Brazil’s estimated
investments in regional transportation projects is 24.7% and 40.7% of the total Cosiplan port-
folio. Accordingly, Argentina’s relative estimated investment is 0.061 with respect to Brazil.
Thus, the setting of the ρ1 and ρ2 values is such that each increment of 0.01 in ρ2 is equivalent
to that of 0.0061 in ρ1. Table 9 reports the retained ρ1–ρ2 combinations and the resulting net
steady-state effects on the selected variables. Figure 4 displays the percent change in y1, y2,
and ygap.
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Figure 4: Coordinated increase of public investment in transportation infrastructure by both
countries (GDP percent): ∆ρ1 = 0.0061 and ∆ρ2 = 0.01.
According to Figure 4, similar to the precedent case, the resulting net effect on real output
is positive for both countries (blue and green lines are above the zero axis): win-win scenario
in terms of output growth. The main difference is the decline in the output gap (red line below
the zero axis), implying a positive net effect on economic convergence. Table 9 quantifies these
effects and reveals that both countries are unambiguously better off in terms of real output,
after the coordinated bilateral public investment—that is, %∆y1 > 0 and %∆y2 > 0—and in
terms of output convergence, %∆ygap < 0. Thus, a coordinated policy does make a difference.
Unasur’s initiative of building regional infrastructure as part of a coordinated investment plan
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ρ1 ρ2 % ∆k
g
1 %∆k
g
2 %∆τ %∆y1 %∆y2 %∆ygap %∆z12 %∆z21 %∆ι1 %∆ι2
0.035 0.015 - - - - - - - - - -
0.041 0.025 21.974 89.85 -3.776 3.525 14.216 -5.554 4.925 16.174 1.954 -7.589
0.047 0.035 18.934 53.988 -3.577 3.509 10.17 -3.333 4.447 12.319 1,371 -4.759
0.053 0.045 17.154 38.976 -3.464 3.477 8.219 -2.073 4.112 10.498 1,016 -3.411
0.059 0.055 15.437 30.717 -3.372 3.328 7.053 -1.49 3.704 9.45 0.748 -2.758
0.065 0.065 13.813 25.479 -3.287 3.118 6.267 -1.308 3.253 8.782 0.52 -2.459
0.071 0.075 12.921 21.854 -3.222 3.037 5.69 -0.978 2.987 8.283 0.342 -2.176
0.077 0.085 11.96 19.189 -3.157 2.904 5.245 -0.877 2.672 7.928 0.181 -2.047
0.084 0.095 11.145 17.143 -3.097 2.783 4.889 -0.829 2.381 7.651 0.037 -1.971
0.09 0.105 10.275 15.519 -3.034 2.623 4.594 -0.952 2.042 7.454 -0.106 -1.988
0.096 0.115 9.848 14.199 -2.988 2.572 4.343 -0.82 1.863 7.256 -0.209 -1.902
0.102 0.125 9.316 13.101 -2.938 2.479 4.126 -0.841 1.632 7.109 -0.314 -1.89
Table 9: Coordinated increase of public investment in transportation infrastructure in both
countries: ∆ρ1 = 0.0061 and ∆ρ2 = 0.01
is a potential convergence source. This finding supports, in the case of the South America,
Figuieres et al. (2013)’s conclusion on the long-run convergence of a balance growth paths in
the case of the coordinated provision of public infrastructure.
The results for commercial integration are more or less the same as those in the previous
case of non-coordination. A coordinated provision of public infrastructure between Argentina
and Brazil, two neighboring commercial partner countries, is advantageous for commercial
integration.
4.3 Output Convergence: Possibilities
Thus far, as summarized in Table 10, the results revealed that higher investment in public
transportation in Argentina and Brazil, either uncoordinated or coordinated, benefits com-
mercial integration; that is, the amount of exchanged merchandise unambiguously increases.
The output convergence results depend on the type of policy; however, the effect on output
convergence is only attained when the increase is coordinated by both governments.
Trade integration Output convergence
Argentina(AR) positive: %∆z12 > 0 and %∆z21 < 0 negative: %∆ygap > 0
Brazil(BR) positive: %∆z12 < 0 and %∆z21 > 0 positive: %∆ygap < 0
AR–BR uncoordinated positive: %∆z12 > 0 and %∆z21 > 0 negative: %∆ygap > 0
AR–BR coordinated positive: %∆z12 > 0 and %∆z21 > 0 positive: %∆ygap < 0
Table 10: Summary of results
Figure 5 further generalizes the output convergence results and graphically describes the
effects on output gap between Brazil and Argentina for all combinations of ρ1 and ρ2 between
their benchmark value (ρ1 = 0.035, ρ2 = 0.015) and 0.1; that is, ρ1 ∈ (0.0035, 0.1), ρ2 ∈
(0.0015, 0.1).
According to Figure 5, The output gap between Argentina and Brazil reaches its lowest
value when Brazil, the less productive country (lowest TPF), invests 10% of its real GDP
in transportation infrastructure, while Argentina remains at the benchmark. By contrast,
the largest output gap between Argentina and Brazil is attained when Argentina, the more
productive of the both (highest TPF), increases ρ1 to 0.1. Thus, a coordinated policy does not
permit the attainment of the lowest output gap; however, it is the only policy that provides a
win-win scenario of output convergence.
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Figure 5: Net steady-state effect of a real output gap for several ρ1 and ρ2 combinations: ρ1 ∈
(0.0035, 0.1), ρ2 ∈ (0.0015, 0.1).
5 Conclusion
This study adopts a two-country general equilibrium framework to analyze commercial in-
tegration and output convergence effects when neighboring partner countries increase public
investment in transportation infrastructure. The main findings are as follows.
First, Argentina and Brazil’s government decision to unilaterally increase their share of
GDP allocated to infrastructure investment generates a win-lose situation in terms of economic
growth, which does not necessarily imply output convergence. Only if Brazil—whose public
investment and productivity is lower—(solely) improves its public investment share of output,
does a catch-up situation emerge, namely, Brazil’s output grows, while that of Argentina de-
creases (win-lose-catch up). The contrary holds true when Argentina solely improves its public
investment share of output: a win-lose divergence situation.
Second, increasing public investment in the two neighboring partner countries certainly
provided an impetus to commercial integration between them, but did not necessarily generate
output converge. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, only a coordinated public investment,
as proposed by Unasur’s integration initiative: IIRSA-Cosiplan, can improve both commercial
integration and output convergence.
Third, the lowest output gap is not attained by a coordinated public investment but by
a unilateral catch-up policy. Nevertheless, coordination is the only way to achieve output
convergence in a win-win economic growth scenario. This is a key point to consider when ad-
dressing regional policy issues and makes it easier to adopt a policy-generated win-win scenario
in regional political negotiations.
It is worth mentioning that the main objective of IIRSA is to mitigate the biggest obstacles
in physical integration (e.g., bottlenecks and missing links); however, as revealed by this study,
this “physical integration” plan has a number of potential spillovers that are pro commercial
integration and output convergence. Unasur, perhaps, has underestimated the projects’ effects
on regional integration. To further investigate these effects, this study can be extended in
18
a number of directions. For instance, the results could be transposed to any pair of South
American nations, given the nature of Unasur’s initiative, allowing a multi-country framework
to provide interesting interactions to the effect of such an integration. Moreover, a welfare
analysis is required before affirming that a potential long-run output convergence can generate
regional development (convergence of living standards). Finally, the theoretical framework
herein can be improved by endogenously determining the home bias parameter, which is crucial
for the commercial channel.
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A Appendix
A.1 Intermediate Sector Optimal Pricing
The profits derived from the optimal pricing for a competitive firm that produces intermediate
goods and uses two private inputs, capital (ki,t) and labor (ni,t), is given by
Πt(zi,t) = zi,t − ci,t(zi,t, κi,t, wi,t),
where ci,t(zi,t, κi,t, wi,t) is the cost function. The firm selects its production level, zi,t, to maxi-
mize profits:
max zi,t − ci,t(zi,t, κi,t, wi,t),
which implies
Πzi,t = 1− czi,t(zi,t, κi,t, wi,t) = 0, (28)
or, equivalently, the producer price equals marginal cost at zi,t optimal.
Given the production function (1), the cost function of the representative firm is defined as
ci,t(zi,t, κi,t, wi,t) = min wi,tni,t + κi,tki,t s.t. ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ
kαi,tn
1−α
i,t ≥ zi,t.
Defining L = wi,tni,t + κi,tki,t − λ[ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ
kαi,tn
1−α
i,t − zi,t] and solving it using the Lagrange
method, gives us
Lki,t = κi,t − λαai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ
kα−1i,t n
1−α
i,t = 0, (29)
Lni,t = wi,t − λ(1− α)ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ
kαi,tn
−α
i,t = 0, (30)
Lλ,t = ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ
kαi,tn
1−α
i,t − zi,t = 0. (31)
The combination of (29) and (30) produces the optimal allocation of inputs:
αwi,tni,t = (1− α)κi,tki,t, or wi,t
κi,t
=
(
1− α
α
)
ki,t
ni,t
,
where
(
1−α
α
) ki,t
ni,t
is the marginal rate of technical substitution and
wi,t
κi,t
the isocost slope. Note
that in rearranging the terms of the standard relationships and asserting them in a competitive
environment, the price of production factors equals their marginal products:
ki,t =
(
α
1− α
)
wi,t
κi,t
ni,t, ni,t =
(
1− α
α
)
κi,t
wi,t
ki,t.
Plug each one of the former optimal relationship into (31) to obtain the conditional factor
demands:
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ [( α
1− α
)
wi,t
κi,t
ni,t
]α
n1−αi,t = zi,t,
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ ( α
1− α
)α wαi,t
καi,t
nαi,tn
1−α
i,t = zi,t,
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ ( α
1− α
)α wαi,t
καi,t
ni,t = zi,t,
ni,t(zi,t) =
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ [(1− α)κi,t
αwi,t
]α
,
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ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ
kαi,t
[(
1− α
α
)
κi,t
wi,t
ki,t
]1−α
= zi,t,
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ
ki,t
[(
1− α
α
)
κi,t
wi,t
]1−α
= zi,t,
ki,t(zi,t) =
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ [ αwi,t
(1− α)κi,t
]1−α
,
ki,t(zi,t) =
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ [ αwi,t
(1− α)κi,t
]1−α
, ni,t(zi,t) =
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ [(1− α)κi,t
αwi,t
]α
. (32)
The cost function ci,t(zi,t, κi,t, wi,t) is then constructed by plugging the conditional factor
demands into
ci,t(zi,t, κi,t, wi,t) = wi,tni,t(zi,t) + κi,tki,t(zi,t)
= wi,t
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ [(1− α)κi,t
αwi,t
]α
+ κi,t
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ [ αwi,t
(1− α)κi,t
]1−α
, =
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ καi,tw1−αi,t [(1− α)α
]α
+
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ καi,tw1−αi,t [ α(1− α)
]1−α
,
=
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ καi,tw1−αi,t [α−α (1− α)α + α1−α (1− α)α−1] ,
=
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ καi,tw1−αi,t [α−α (1− α)α + αα−α (1− α) ,α (1− α)−1]
=
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ καi,tw1−αi,t (1− α)α α−α [1 + α (1− α)−1] ,
=
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ καi,tw1−αi,t (1− α)α α−α (1− α)−1 ,
=
zi,t
ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ καi,tw1−αi,t (1− α)α−1 α−α,
which implies that the analytic expression of (28) is
1 =
καi,tw
1−α
i,t
αα (1− α)1−α ai,t
(
kgi,t
)γ .
Thus, the optimal pricing of a perfectly competitive firm producing intermediate goods 3 is
derived.
A.2 Optimal Demand of Intermediate Goods and Final Goods Price
Index
The firm producing final goods in country 1 maximizes its profit:
max
z11,t,z12,t
: Π = p1,t
[
ϕ
1
µ
1 (z11,t)
µ−1
µ + (1− ϕ1)
1
µ (z12,t)
µ−1
µ
] µ
µ−1
− z11,t − qt (1 + τt) z12,t.
The associated first-order conditions are as follows:
Πz11,t = p1,t
[
ϕ
1
µ
1 (z11,t)
µ−1
µ + (1− ϕ1) 1µ (z12,t)
µ−1
µ
] 1
µ−1
ϕ
1
µ
1 (z11,t)
−1
µ − 1 = 0, (33)
Πz12,t = p1,t
[
ϕ
1
µ
1 (z11,t)
µ−1
µ + (1− ϕ1) 1µ (z12,t)
µ−1
µ
] 1
µ−1
(1− ϕ1) 1µ (z12,t)− 1µ − qt (1 + τt) = 0. (34)
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As y1,t =
[
ϕ
1
µ
1 (z11,t)
µ−1
µ + (1− ϕ1) 1µ (z12,t)
µ−1
µ
] µ
µ−1
, (33) and (34) become
p1,ty
1
µ
1,tϕ
1
µ
1 (z11,t)
−1
µ − 1 = 0,
p1,ty
1
µ
1,t(1− ϕ1)
1
µ (z12,t)
− 1
µ − qt (1 + τt) = 0.
Thus, the optimal demands for intermediate goods in country 1 are as follows:
z11,t = ϕ1p
µ
1,ty1,t, (35)
z12,t = (1− ϕ1)
[
p1,t
qt (1 + τt)
]µ
y1,t. (36)
The final goods’ price index can be derived by plugging (35) and (36) into the standard
zero-profit condition for the firm producing final goods:
p1,ty1,t = z11,t + qt (1 + τt) z12,t,
which yields
p1,t =
[
ϕ1 + (1− ϕ1)q1−µt (1 + τt)1−µ
] 1
1−µ . (37)
Analogously, the solution to the maximization problem of the firm producing final goods in
country 2 is as follows:
max
z22,t,z21,t
: p2,t
[
ϕ
1
µ
2 (z22,t)
µ−1
µ + (1− ϕ2)
1
µ (z21,t)
µ−1
µ
] µ
µ−1
− z22,t − q−1t (1 + τt) z21,t,
which results in the following optimal demands for intermediate goods and the price index of
final goods:
z22,t = ϕ2p
µ
2,ty2,t, (38)
z21,t = (1− ϕ2)
[
p2,tqt
(1 + τt)
]µ
y2,t, (39)
p2,t =
[
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ2)
[
(1 + τt)
qt
]1−µ] 11−µ
. (40)
A.3 Representative Household Problem
The representative household i choose ci,t, ni,t, ki,t+1, and di,t+1 to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {ln (ci,t) + γn,i ln (1− ni,t)}
subject to
pi,tci,t + pi,t [ki,t+1 − (1− δ) ki,t] + pi,tφ
2
(ki,t+1 − ki,t)2 + Etrt,t+1di,t+1 ≤ (wi,tni,t + κi,tki,t) (1− ρi,t) + di,t,
and the no-ponzi game constraint of the form lims→∞Etrt,t+sdi,t+s ≥ 0. Solving the house-
hold problem using Lagrange’s techniques implies the maximization of the following associated
Lagrangian function:
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt {ln (ci,t) + γn,i ln (1− ni,t, )}
−λi,t
{
pi,t
[
ci,t + ki,t+1 − (1− δ) ki,t + φ2 (ki,t+1 − ki,t)2
]
+ Etrt,t+1di,t+1,
}
−λi,t {− (wi,tni,t + κi,tki,t) (1− ρi,t)− di,t} .
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The resulting first order-order conditions are as follows:
βt
1
ci,t
− pi,tλi,t = 0
,− β
tγn,i
1− ni,t + λi,twi,t (1− ρi,t) = 0
,−λi,t {pi,t [1 + φ (ki,t+1 − ki,t)]} − λi,t+1 {pi,t+1 [−1 + δ − φ (ki,t+2 − ki,t+1)]− κi,t+1 (1− ρi,t+1)} = 0
,−λi,tEtrt,t+1 + λi,t+1 = 0.
Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier using λi,t =
βt
pi,tci,t
yields
βtγn,i
1− ni,t =
βt
pi,tci,t
wi,t (1− ρi,t)
,− β
t+1
pi,t+1ci,t+1
{pi,t+1 [−1 + δ − φ (ki,t+2 − ki,t+1)]− κi,t+1 (1− ρi,t+1)} = β
t
pi,tci,t
{pi,t [1 + φ (ki,t+1 − ki,t)]}
,
βt+1
pi,t+1ci,t+1
=
βt
pi,tci,t
Etrt,t+1.
The first order-conditions can, thus, be summarized as
pi,tci,t
1− ni,t =
wi,t (1− ρi,t)
γn,i
(41)
, 1 + φ (ki,t+1 − ki,t) = βEt ci,t
ci,t+1
[
1− δ + φ (ki,t+2 − ki,t+1) + κi,t+1
pi,t+1
(1− ρi,t+1)
]
(42)
, β−1Etrt,t+1 = Et
pi,tci,t
pi,t+1ci,t+1
. (43)
Equation (41) is the labor supply function that captures the intra-temporal trade-off between consumption
and time spent working. Equation (42) is the inter-temporal Euler equation that governs the accumulation
of domestic capital. Finally, equation (43) will be applied later to derive the risk-sharing condition under the
assumption of complete markets.
To obtain the risk-sharing condition under the assumption of complete markets, combine (43) for i = 1, 2
to obtain
p1,tc1,t
p2,tc2,t
=
p1,t+1c1,t+1
p2,t+1c2,t+1
, which if iterated one period forward, yields
p1,t+1c1,t+1
p2,t+1c2,t+1
=
p1,t+2c1,t+2
p2,t+2c2,t+2
. Now, plug
the latter to the first so that
p1,tc1,t
p2,tc2,t
=
p1,t+2c1,t+2
p2,t+2c2,t+2
.
After repetitive substitutions, the general formulation for time t+ k yields
p1,tc1,t
p2,tc2,t
=
p1,t+kc1,t+k
p2,t+kc2,t+k
,
which at date 0 is
p1,0c1,0
p2,0c2,0
=
p1,tc1,t
p2,tc2,t
.
Finally, let θ =
p1,0c1,0
p2,0c2,0
be a constant that depends on the initial cross-country distribution of wealth to
obtain the following risk-sharing condition:
θp2,tc2,t = p1,tc1,t. (44)
A.4 Summary of Equilibrium Conditions
Labor supply:
γn,1
p1,tc1,t
1− n1,t = w1,t (1− ρ1,t) , (45)
γn,2
p2,tc2,t
1− n2,t = w2,t (1− ρ2,t) . (46)
Accumulation of physical capital:
1 + φ (k1,t+1 − k1,t) = βEt c1,t
c1,t+1
[
1− δ + φ (k1,t+2 − k1,t+1) + κ1,t+1
p1,t+1
(1− ρ1,t+1)
]
, (47)
25
1 + φ (k2,t+1 − k2,t) = βEt c2,t
c2,t+1
[
1− δ + φ (k2,t+2 − k2,t+1) + κ2,t+1
p2,t+1
(1− ρ2,t+1)
]
. (48)
Complete markets’ risk-sharing condition:
θp2,tc2,t = p1,tc1,t. (49)
Intermediate goods production functions:
z1,t = a1,t
(
kg1,t
)γ
kα1,tn
1−α
1,t , (50)
z2,t = a2,t
(
kg2,t
)γ
kα2,tn
1−α
2,t . (51)
Intermediate sector factors’ use:
αw1,tn1,t = (1− α)κ1,tk1,t, (52)
αw2,tn2,t = (1− α)κ2,tk2,t. (53)
Intermediate goods pricing:
αα (1− α)1−α a1,t
(
kg1,t
)γ
= κα1,tw
1−α
1,t , (54)
αα (1− α)1−α a2,t
(
kg2,t
)γ
= κα2,tw
1−α
2,t . (55)
Transportation cost:
τt =
χ(
kg1,t
)η (
kg2,t
)1−η . (56)
Final goods price indexes:
p1,t =
[
ϕ1 + (1− ϕ1)q1−µt (1 + τt)1−µ
] 1
1−µ
, (57)
p2,t =
[
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ2)
[
(1 + τt)
qt
]1−µ] 11−µ
. (58)
Intermediate goods market clearing:
ηz1,t = ηϕ1p
µ
1,ty1,t + (1− ϕ2)
[
p2,tqt
(1 + τt)
]µ
y2,t, (59)
z2,t = ϕ2p
µ
2,ty2,t + η(1− ϕ1)
[
p1,t
qt (1 + τt)
]µ
y1,t. (60)
Accumulation of public capital:
kg1,t+1 − (1− δg) kg1,t =
ρ1,t
p1,t
(w1,tn1,t + κ1,tk1,t) =
ρ1,t
p1,t
z1,t, (61)
kg2,t+1 − (1− δg) kg2,t =
ρ2,t
p2,t
(w2,tn2,t + κ2,tk2,t) =
ρ2,t
p2,t
z2,t
21. (62)
Final goods market clearing:
c1,t + k1,t+1 − (1− δ) k1,t + kg1,t+1 − (1− δg) kg1,t +
φ
2
(k1,t+1 − k1,t)2 = y1,t, (63)
c2,t + k2,t+1 − (1− δ) k2,t + kg2,t+1 − (1− δg) kg2,t +
φ
2
(k2,t+1 − k2,t)2 = y2,t. (64)
Hence, the system contains 20 endogenous variables: p1,t, c1,t, n1,t, w1,t, p2,t, c2,t, n2,t, w2,t, k1,t, κ1,t, k2,t,
κ2,t, z1,t, z2,t, k
g
1,t, k
g
2,t, τt, q,t, y1,t, and y2,t; four exogenous variables: a1, a2, ρ1, and ρ2; and 20 equations.
21Note that, at the intermediate firm optimum α
zi,t
ki,t
= κi,t and (1− α) zi,tni,t = wi,t, so, wi,tni,t+κi,tki,t = zi,t.
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A.5 Steady State
At the steady state, the model is static (all variables are constant in time). Thus, Tobin’s Q representation—
1 + φ (ki − ki) for i = 1, 2—equals one, and the adjustment cost φ2 (ki − ki)2 disappears. Next, let us set q = 1,
so that the final goods’ price indexes can be recovered from
p¯1 =
[
ϕ1 + (1− ϕ1) (1 + τ)1−µ
] 1
1−µ
, (65)
p¯2 =
[
ϕ2 + (1− ϕ2) (1 + τ)1−µ
] 1
1−µ
. (66)
Now, use the dynamics of physical capital accumulation, equations (47) and (48), to obtain:
β−1 − 1 + δ
(1− ρ1) p¯1 = κ¯1,
β−1 − 1 + δ
(1− ρ2) p¯2 = κ¯2.
Once κ¯1 and κ¯2 are known,
22 use (54), (55), (52), and (53), combined with (61) and (62), to find z¯1 and
z¯2, as follows. First, use (52) and (53) to express private capital as a function of hours worked (which are set
to 0.3 at the steady state); that is,
k1 =
αw1n1
(1− α)κ¯1 , (67)
k2 =
αw2n2
(1− α)κ¯2 . (68)
Moreover, according to (54) and (55), real wages are
(1− α)
[
α
κ¯1
] α
1−α
a¯
1
1−α
1 (k
g
1)
γ
1−α = w1, (69)
(1− α)
[
α
κ¯2
] α
1−α
a¯
1
1−α
2 (k
g
2)
γ
1−α = w2. (70)
Now, insert both expressions, (69) ((70)) and (67) ((68)), into the intermediate good production function,
(50) ((51)), to obtain
z1 = a¯1 (k
g
1)
γ
kα1 n¯
1−α
1 ,
z1 = a¯1 (k
g
1)
γ α
α
(1− α)ακ¯α1
(w1)
α
n¯1,
z1 = a¯1 (k
g
1)
γ α
α
(1− α)ακ¯α1
(1− α)α
[
α
κ¯1
] αα
1−α
a¯
α
1−α
1 (k
g
1)
αγ
1−α n¯1,
z1 = a¯
1
1−α
1 (k
g
1)
γ
1−α
[
α
κ¯1
] α
1−α
n¯1.
From (61) ((62)), it is known that
kg1 =
ρ¯1
δgp¯1
z1 ; k
g
2 =
ρ¯2
δgp¯2
z2. (71)
Accordingly, z¯1 (z¯2) is given by
z¯1 =
{[
a¯1
(
ρ¯1
δgp¯1
)γ (
α
κ¯1
)α] 11−α
n¯1
} 1−α
1−α−γ
; z¯2 =
{[
a¯2
(
ρ¯2
δgp¯2
)γ (
α
κ¯2
)α] 11−α
n¯2
}
.
Once z¯1 and z¯2 are known, public capital is
k¯g1 =
ρ¯1
δgp¯1
z¯1 ; k¯
g
2 =
ρ¯2
δgp¯2
z¯2,
22The bar refers to the steady-state values.
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and, as τ is set to 0.16; the trade cost equation allows us to retrieve χ from(
k¯g1
)η (
k¯g2
)1−η
τ¯ = χ.
Furthermore, combining (69) and (70) with (67) and (68) (and using zi = a¯i (k
g
i )
γ
kαi n¯
1−α
i ) permits the
recovery of the steady-state value for private capital and wages from
k¯1 = α
z¯1
κ¯1
; k¯2 = α
z¯2
κ¯2
,
w¯1 = (1− α) z¯1
n¯1
; w¯2 = (1− α) z¯2
n¯2
.
It follows that y¯1 and y¯2 can be recovered from the intermediate goods market’s clearing conditions; that
is,
ηz¯1 = ηϕ1p¯
µ
1y1 + (1− ϕ2)p¯µ2 (1 + τ¯)−µ y2, (72)
z¯2 = ϕ2p¯
µ
2y2 + η(1− ϕ1)p¯µ1 (1 + τ¯)−µ y1. (73)
To do so, plug (73) of the form [
z¯2 − η(1− ϕ1)p¯µ1 (1 + τ¯)−µ y1
]
ϕ−12 p¯
−µ
2 = y2
into (72) to get
y¯1 =
[
ηz¯1 − (1− ϕ2)
ϕ2
(1 + τ¯)
−µ
z¯2
] [
ϕ1 − (1− ϕ2)(1− ϕ1)
ϕ2
(1 + τ¯)
−2µ
]−1
1
ηp¯µ1
.
Thus,
y¯2 =
1
ϕ2p¯
µ
2
[
z¯2 − η(1− ϕ1)p¯µ1 (1 + τ¯)−µ y¯1
]
.
Finally, c1 and c2 are recovered from the final goods market’s clearing conditions:
c1 + δk¯1 + δgk¯
g
1 = y¯1,
c2 + δk¯2 + δgk¯
g
2 = y¯2.
Note that as n1 and n2 are calibrated at the steady state, γn,1 and γn,2 can be retrieved from the labor
supply equations, (45) and (46); that is,
γn,1 =
w¯1 (1− n¯1) (1− ρ¯1)
p¯1c¯1
,
γn,2 =
w¯2 (1− n¯2) (1− ρ¯2)
p¯2c¯2
.
Similarly, θ is set using the risk-sharing condition (49):
θ =
p¯1c¯1
p¯2c¯2
.
Hence, the steady-state value of all variables is known.
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